The Islamic State (IS) has become notorious for violent, brutal actions and the presentation of these actions in social and mainstream media. Excessive violence creates a spectacle for the news media. However, IS propaganda also emphasizes its role in state building and its engagement in social and welfare work. This twofold propaganda enables the mobilization of different audiences, but it also sends conflicting messages about the organization. In this article, we study the e-magazine Dabiq, emphasizing their methods of gaining support and attempting to recruit Western participants to violent jihadism. We use theories of social movement and subculture to reveal some of the underlying tensions in IS's communicative strategies. The analysis first identifies how IS frame their propaganda attempting to mobilize widespread support. Then, it highlights another dimension of IS's rhetoric; provocations, the creation of sensationalist spectacles of violence and links to excitement seeking, stardom and popular culture. We conclude that combining general anti-Western rhetoric and religious imagery with extraordinary depictions of violence has been both a strength and flaw in the organization's propaganda.
Introduction
On June 29, 2014 , The Islamic State (IS) -also known as ISIS or Daesh -officially declared the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claimed the title of Caliph and leader of the world's Muslim population. 1 The organization has had a pervasive presence in both social media and the mainstream media, overshadowing other terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda (AQ), al Shabaab, Hamas and Hizballah. In its attempts to appeal to the sensationalist news media and gain attention, provoke and incite fear, IS has constructed several spectacles, including the destruction of artwork, brutal murders and executions. Although these actions are only a small part of the propaganda IS promotes, they have become the focus of the mainstream media. 2 However, IS has also been running a more positive propaganda campaign, emphasizing the state-building and social welfare schemes run by the organization. 3 The goal of IS was to create an Islamic state, which they described as a caliphate. In their state-building effort, the organization depended on some mainstream support to gain financial aid and mobilize families to migrate to the parts of Syria and Iraq that IS had occupied. When trying to build a state, the promotion of explicit violence can be considered excessive and unnecessary, deterring individuals who would otherwise support the organization. 4 Disagreements over the degree of violence was one of the reasons for the break between IS and other violent jihadist organizations. IS was considered too brutal, and Al
Qaeda and the Nusra Front wanted a more civilized approach to win the hearts and minds of the Syrian people. 5 As Byman points out, the brutality of IS was not only a by-product of war, but a deliberate strategy. 6 Examining the organization's characteristics as both a social movement and a subculture can be helpful when attempting to understand the complex message of IS propaganda. Social movement theory has contributed important insights into violent jihadist organizations. 7 By focusing on the broader dynamics and processes of political mobilization it is possible to reveal how these organizations frame their message to reach a large audience.
At the same time there is only a small minority that is drawn towards terrorist organizations.
In recent years in Europe there has been a trend that radicalized individuals and potential terrorists have a background in violent and criminal subcultures. 8 In line with this, previous research has established that subcultural theory too is crucial to understanding radicalization and terrorism. 9 Despite the many studies of terrorist organisations using both social movement and subcultural theory, thus far, no one has combined the two, or discussed the possible tensions between them in terms of organizational rhetoric.
We use a qualitative text analysis of Dabiq to address these issues, demonstrating the ways in which IS propaganda mobilizes broad support using both widespread jihadist rhetoric and social movement frames. Following subcultural logic, IS uses violence as a spectacle to appeal to excitement-seeking youth. The result of these two communicative approaches is the ambiguity of IS rhetoric when targeting a Western audience.
IS and Dabiq
IS was formerly known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and was founded by Abu Musab alZarqawi, who died in an American air assault in 2006. The organization was previously governed by Al Qaeda, but internal conflicts ended the collaboration. 10 After conquering large parts of the Iraqi Sunni heartland in June 2014, the organization attracted the attention of the global media under the new name the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). They surprised international society with their swift advances, seizing roughly a third of Iraqi and Syrian territories in three months with an inferior military force. 11 McCants offers three main reasons for the establishment and initial success of IS. First, the US withdrawal from Iraq and the insurgency in Syria played out in favour of IS and resulted in a powerful base in Syria.
Second, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's credibility as a leader was greater than that of his predecessors. Finally, IS proclaimed the reestablishment of the caliphate, which solidified their legitimacy. 12 Their success was short-lived, and three years later in 2017 the group lost control of their territory and the caliphate had fallen, reverting the group back into a terrorist network.
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IS's media strategy included an extensive online presence and direct control of media output. 14 This propaganda includes pictures, magazines, videos, music and even videogames 15 that are shared on social media and different Internet sites. 16 The e-magazine Dabiq has emerged as an important vehicle for IS propaganda toward a Western audience. Before the attack on Mosul in June 2014, IS media statements were issued through two different magazines. Military reports where promoted through Islamic State news (ISN) and political reporting was conducted through Islamic State Report (ISR). These magazines were combined into Dabiq after the declaration of the caliphate. 17 The magazine is well designed and can be seen as sophisticated and modern, resembling Western news or entertainment magazines in form. It is written or translated into English and French to reach potential
Western recruits, including a large group of marginalized excitement-seeking young men, but since it is an e-magazine it is difficult to know how many people who actually reads it. 18 The magazine also targets Western policymakers and works as a corrective document for members of IS.
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Dabiq is published by the media channel al-Hayat Media Center. The name of the magazine is taken from the small town of Dabiq in northern Aleppo, Syria. The town does not hold any significance in size or offer any specific advantage as a military position, but according to apocalyptic prophecies in Islam, it is the place of the last battle between Muslims and their enemies. 20 The magazine represents IS as an organization and often refrains from crediting individual authors. 21 It gives readers an impression of religious legitimacy and authenticity by frequently citing verses from the Koran, hadiths, and suras, as well as citing significant Islamist figures and high ranking individuals of IS. The magazine includes longer articles and reportages while also offering shorter reports, statements and eye-catching advertisements. 22 The magazine can generally be divided into two types of content. The first type covers reportages about state building, aid work, military successes, religious practice and history. The second type involves images and texts about the destruction of historical artefacts, child soldiers, brutal murders and executions.
Previous research on Dabiq has analysed its strategic and doctrinal message, 23 often using a quantitative, 24 multimodal, 25 or visual approach. 26 It has also been compared to Al
Qaeda's e-magazines Inspire and Resurgence. 27 Few have emphasized the ambiguity in the rhetoric or examined it in light of social movement and subcultural theory. The brutality displayed by IS has generally been explained by the local context of prolonged historical conflicts and brutal actions conducted by all parties. 28 However, these issues do not fully explain the imagery and promotion of violence aimed at a Western audience.
Social movements and subcultures
Social movement theory (SMT) is a wide and heterogeneous field within sociology and political science, and it contains a diverse range of analytical frameworks that are used to explore different dynamics within social movements. 29 No hegemonic definition of a social movement exists, but Zald and McCarthy define it as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements of the social structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society." 30 Collective action framing describes the processes of meaning construction 31 and focuses on "the social production and dissemination of meaning and on how individuals come to conceptualize themselves as a collectivity." 32 Framing theory is one of three central traditions in social movement studies, the other two being political opportunities and mobilizing structures. 33 Collective action framing is particularly relevant when studying social movement rhetoric and propaganda.
The key principle of framing theory is that "events rarely speak for themselves," and different frames compete to be the authoritative interpretation. 34 Benford and Snow identify three central framing tasks. Initially, movements construct frames that diagnose a condition as a problem that demands change, which includes the attribution of blame and responsibility.
Then, the movement will offer solutions to the problem, which includes specific tactics and strategies intended to alleviate injustice. Finally, the movement will offer a reason to motivate and support collective action. 35 Combined, these constitute the collective action frames or the "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meaning" that mobilize participants and activities in social movement organizations.
36
While much of the content in Dabiq can be characterized as collective action framing, a substantial part of it does not immediately fit within this type of framework. Arguably, this other content can be better understood using subculture theory. Subcultural studies are often seen as a response to the realization that society includes a multitude of social practices "some of which are 'alternative' or 'unconventional,' others of which are transgressive or even oppositional." 37 This theory was introduced by the Chicago school of sociology 38 as a naturalistic perspective emphasizing the "normality of deviance" as opposed to the established pathological approach. 39 Subcultures are frequently framed as being in some way oppositional to mainstream society, which is most evident in The Birmingham School's neo-Marxist framework. 40 This school also contributed to expanding the methodological repertoire of subcultural studies by turning their emphasis towards a semiotic method and identifying style as "the key to subcultural 'meaning' and subcultural distinction." 41 There are many definitions of subcultures, but Gelder captures the basic idea in the following definition:
Subcultures are groups of people that are in some way represented as non-normative and/or marginal through their particular interest and practices, through what they are, what they do and where they do it. They may represent themselves in this way, since subcultures are usually well aware of their differences, bemoaning them, relishing them, exploiting them, and so on. But they will also be represented like this by others, who in response can bring an entire apparatus of social classification and regulation to bear upon them.
42
Violent radicalization and participation in terrorist organizations are not only instrumental acts for political purposes but also expressive and emotional actions motivated by excitement and a search for the larger meaning of life. 43 From this perspective, extreme Islamism can also be a way for marginalized groups and individuals to retaliate against a society from which they feel excluded. 44 Jihadism also entails a seductive culture of "artistic products and social practices" with no military or strategic purpose. 45 Subcultural theory can further be used to understand the cultural architecture behind the subcultural style of jihadism as well as the attraction of subcultures in the absence of status frustration and social and financial exclusion.
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The concept of subcultures has been problematized due to its downplaying of local variation and fragmentation in youth style. 47 Other conceptualizations may arguably be better for avoiding homogeneous conceptualizations of cultures. 48 Three characteristics of what is traditionally described as a subculture are still relevant to understanding IS propaganda. First, as seen in Gelders definition, many subcultures actively attempt to provoke mainstream society. Second, some subcultures celebrate violence and embrace machismo identity, such as counter school cultures, 49 or violent street cultures. 50 For groups of marginalized youths, these violent cultures may be a symbolic resource and a point of imitation for both opposition and resistance. Finally, subcultures are closely related to popular culture and can be a space in which to seek excitement.
ICCT estimates the total number of foreign fighters from states part of the EU was between 3922-4294 persons. The majority came from France, Germany, United Kingdom and Belgium, and between 6 and 23 percent are converts. UNOCT describes the typical foreign fighter as an economically and educationally disadvantaged young male. 51 When using the concept of subculture about IS, we are specifically pointing towards Western recruits, and how their subculture is formed in relation to the Western society they feel alienated from.
There are great differences between gangs and other criminal subcultures and terrorist organizations, for example in the purpose and nature of violence, excitement seeking, and masculinity, but there are also important similarities. 52 A recent trend is that many European IS recruits have a background in violent and criminal subcultures, and the reason for this might be similarities between street culture and jihadist subcultures emerging in the West. 53 When using the concept subculture in this paper, we emphasize these similarities.
IS applies "a vast cultural 'toolkit' of ideas, beliefs, and narratives to target multiple audiences" to gain support for their political aims and objectives. 54 This study uses insights from both social movement and subculture theory to understand IS's rhetoric in Dabiq. We do not argue that IS can be characterized as either a social movement or a subculture but that insights from these research traditions can help us understand the underlying tensions in the organization's propaganda. We analyze the rhetoric in these magazines as attempts at reaching different audiences. This is rhetorical or framing analysis, and not an attempt to establish "root causes" 55 of radicalization. The aim is to describe the main characteristics of IS propaganda, to understand its appeal to different audiences, and to discuss possible effects of the rhetoric.
Methodology
This study is based on 11 issues of the e-magazine Dabiq, which comprises 670 pages published between July 2014 and August 2015. The magazine uses numerous textual highlights and visual expressions, and a systematic tabularization was conducted to give a comprehensible analysis of its content. A detailed analysis of both textual and visual themes was coded based on the emerging content, which was divided into the main topics covered and promoted (e.g., military, politics, religion, media, health) as well as the prescribed format (e.g., article, report, photo report, poem) of the published themes. Using social movement theory, the content was further coded into the categories of diagnostic, prognostic and motivation framing, which constitutes the first part of the analysis below. Subcultural theory was used to code data into different subcultural traits such as provocation, violence and machismo, and excitement seeking, which makes up the last part of the analysis.
Some themes and extracts from Dabiq texts could potentially be covered by both categories of social movement framing and the subcultural categories we constructed. This highlights the potential problems of categorization in general as well as the closely intertwined relationship between these two forms of rhetoric in IS propaganda. Therefore, we examine these analytically derived categorizations to highlight the different forms of rhetoric in IS propaganda. This is a common approach in qualitative method and analysis. 56 Notably, we only discuss IS rhetoric in Dabiq aimed at a Western audience and not the organization or IS propaganda in general. Moreover, changes on the battlefield and in the organization are continuous, resulting in information becoming quickly outdated (for example, the magazine changed its name to Rumiyah after the loss of Dabiq). However, we still believe our analysis can shed light on more general and long-lasting characteristics and ambiguities in the organization.
IS propaganda as social movement framing
The success of IS as a social movement depends on the organization's "ability to promote a specific version of reality and to make this version resonate with the worldview of potential recruits." 57 IS's diagnostic framing presents concrete problems such as identifying enemies, the unjust treatment of Muslims, Western values and practices that demand immediate change. Collective action framing further provides solutions in prognostic frames such as the construction of the Caliphate, jihad, emigrations and the implementation of sharia. Finally, in an effort to motivate individuals to engage in actions supporting the organization, IS appeals to emotions, highlights their success and emphasizes the severity of their message. 58 IS also maintains credibility by substantiating promoted claims through frame consistency, primarily by leaning on religious scripture.
The problem: Western government, Western values and false Islam
In an effort to create a common framework for action, different actors need to operate with a more or less shared understanding of what they define as problematic. 59 As a social movement, IS construct frames that diagnose a condition as a problem that needs to be corrected, including ascribing responsibility and allocating blame. 60 Dabiq presents several different topics that IS identifies as major conditions or issues in need of change. appealing to a master narrative with connotations of the historical precedent of non-Muslim powers who "seek to conquer and destroy the Muslim world and its holy places." 63 The social distance is reinforced through a process of "othering," which distinguishes the actors from each other. 64 Individuals from the West are negatively defined as kuffar (unbeliever) and tawaghit (polytheist). The pejoratives are emphasized by statements from Osama bin Laden, who stated that "The world today is divided into two camps," and former president George W.
Bush's statement that "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists." 65 Also important in the diagnostic framing are descriptions of how Western values and practices result in a wide range of social problems. 66 The theocratic governance under which IS is operating views Western development and sexual liberation as a significant part of the problem they are fighting.
[T]he West was plunged into a downward spiral of sexual deviance and immorality.
With it came a whole slew of sexually transmitted diseases Islam, and IS thus reinforces the sectarian conflict between Shiites and Sunnis that has been downplayed by other extremist Sunni organizations. 68 The rhetoric of religious hate is pervasive in the magazine, and Shiites are generally referred to with the degrading term "sawafi," "nusyari," or more specific terms such as the "dogs of the crusaders." 69 IS's diagnosis of the problem also includes other extreme jihadist organizations and organizations against which they are fighting in Syria, including the Islamic Front, Nusra Front, al-Sahwa,
The Free Syrian Army, the Peshmerga and the Kurdistan Workers' Party. They describe these groups as "murtaddin" (apostate) or "deviant factions" and criticize them for having a false interpretation of Islam and reconciling with enemies "at the expense of His pure religion." 70 The list of problems included in IS's collective action framing is vast and includes The ambition is to expand the caliphate to include not only the Muslim world but also the entire globe, "filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam and putting an end to the falsehood and tyranny of jāhiliyyah [ignorance] ." 74 The caliphate will not only solve the problems of false interpretation of Islam and the persecution of Muslims but also be a way to establish a successfully functioning state. In IS propaganda, the caliphate will work for the Muslim population by improving infrastructure, repairing roads, cleaning cities and offering extensive healthcare to both children and the elderly. This was considered so important that it was even prioritized during the ongoing war.
In the midst of a raging war with multiple fronts and numerous enemies, life goes on in the Islamic State. The soldiers of Allah do not liberate a village, town or city, only to abandon its residents and ignore their needs. 75 The caliphate is depicted as a haven for the oppressed Muslim population in which IS takes 
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Their belief is that the oppressed Muslim population will be freed from the moral, political and military influence of the Western world through the caliphate. The caliphate is described as an effective way of uniting the Muslim Ummah and a goal for all Muslims. On the way to the IS caliphate, several temporary solutions are possible, and waging terrorism against the West is one of them.
Motivation: military success and the forthcoming apocalypse
Diagnostic and prognostic frames are often considered "cold" and rational. Social movements also need motivational frames that appeal to a broader spectrum of emotions including rage, enthusiasm, and joy as well as frames that emphasize the importance of immediate action.
Motivational frames are the most direct frames that mobilize people to support a cause.
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Highlighting and visualizing injustice is crucial for motivation. Appeals to emotion and moral indignation, or "hot cognitions," are important motivational frames 83 and include examples such as pictures in Dabiq of Muslim civilians killed across the world.
An important part of IS's motivational framing was its reports of military success.
Dabiq frequently reported how IS made military advances and conquered new territories.
When successes on the battlefield diminished, they increased their coverage of military success to try to establish an alternative narrative while also trying to reshape the perception of territorial loss as further confirmation of the approaching apocalypse. 84 In the period analysed in this study, the advances were still dominant:
On Monday, the 25 th of Sha´ban, the mujāhidīn of the Islamic State succeeded in liberating the strategic town of Tal Afar in Wilayat Ninawa. 85 The Islamic State announced the expansion of the Khilāfah to Sinai, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, and the Arabian Peninsula, accepting the bay'āt [allegiance] of the mujāhidīn in those lands.
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Motivational frames also include descriptions of the ways in which warriors convert from other jihadi groups, such as Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham, to join IS. In social movement theory, this type of emphasis on social movement success is described as the "rhetoric of change." 87 This is the concept that mobilizing participants for a social movement is easier if that movement is considered successful and movements therefore have an incentive to exaggerate their own successes. For example, the military success of IS caught the attention of the global media, 88 which resulted in an increase in the recruitment of foreign fighters. 89 Not unlike other apocalyptical sects, IS uses a powerful apocalyptical motivational frame with references to prophetic signs depicting "the Hour," or the Day of Judgement. 90 The Hour will not be established until the Romans land at al-A'maq or Dabiq (two places near each other in the northern countryside of Halab). Then an army from alMadinah of the best people on the earth at that time will leave for them. 
IS propaganda as subcultural provocation
Violent jihadism in the West can be seen as a subcultural response to a feeling of alienation in Western society. 93 Dabiq promotes violence and a romanticized view of war and honour in which the fellowship between "brothers" is central. This form of "jihadi cool," a trend of imitating the masculine Muslim warrior, 94 has many parallels with the masculinity and view on violence promoted in street gangs and in street subcultures. 95 Dabiq can therefore be seen not only as social movement framing but also as textual and visual expressions of a subculture.
Provocations
IS follows sharia doctrine and enforces severe sanctions, such as the death penalty, for theological, political and sexual deviance. 96 IS does not always use a predetermined set of sanctions when implementing sharia; instead, it employs innovative execution methods. IS stages and documents executions to an extent not previously seen, using multiple cameras and putting substantial work into producing widely distributed movies. Graphic portrayals of decapitation resulted in major media attention at first, but the power to shock diminished over time. After a while, the media helped to "domesticate and decontextualize" the executions "by producing banal indifference rather than moral outrage." 97 IS then started multiple simultaneous executions, using children as executioners as well as other extreme methods, such as burning prisoners alive, to gain more attention. Dabiq covered this in great detail.
The burning of a Jordanian pilot on 3 January 2015 was covered extensively and promoted as retribution against acts of war that bombed regions controlled by IS. 98 The burning was justified by presenting photos of children and infants burnt to death and followed the logic of an eye for an eye. The staged performance and documentation of the event still
indicates that the extreme violence was a goal in itself and an integrated part of IS propaganda. In Dabiq, the execution is clearly visualized by selecting a large picture in which the pilot is standing in a cage covered in flames. He is holding his hands to his face in pain, but the flames are covering him completely, making his identification difficult. A smaller portrait of the pilot's face is placed on the same page. The article concludes with a picture of the charred corpse of "the murtadd pilot" with obvious parallels to the burnt Muslim children. 99 This brutal execution -and its dramatic documentation -can seem incomprehensible and disproportionate to an outsider, but it can be construed as a meaningful and legitimate act within a subcultural framework. Subcultures embrace and cultivate otherness in active detachment from mainstream society. 100 The otherness represented by IS is similar to that of criminal street cultures in which being feared is an important asset.
The magazine also displays children as violent perpetrators, 101 archaeological objects reported to be up to 3000 years old are knocked over and smashed with sledgehammers and jackhammers. 106 IS justifies the destruction of historical objects in a religious framework, a practice known as iconoclasm, 107 but there is also an element of general vandalism to these actions. Cohen describes the malice in deviant behaviour and how individuals receive pleasure from others' dismay, a type of "schadenfreude." 108 These actions can be seen as similar to gang members conducting vandalism "for its own sake," 109 and the coverage of this destruction in Dabiq can appeal to those fascinated by vandalism in general.
Arguably, the call for terrorist attacks in the West -as well as the attacks themselvescan also be seen more as provocative actions than strategic military manoeuvers. For example, the language in the infamous call for terrorist attacks in the West is strikingly spiteful:
If you can kill a disbelieving American or European -especially the spiteful and filthy
French -or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be. 110 The common element in explicit violence, child soldiers, the destruction of historical sites and artefacts, and terrorism is that despite their religious, military or other form of justification, the graphic details and emphasis they receive in Dabiq indicates that they also play another role. Obvious provocations will attract the interest of the international media, will help draw the attention of a particular group of people especially interested in violence and vandalism, and, following a subcultural logic emphasizing sometimes extreme otherness, can also be a goal in itself for people in the organization.
Celebration of violence and machismo
A subculture is usually aware of its otherness. This otherness can be embraced and cultivated, but it will also exclude those who do not identify with or belong to the subculture. 111 The are romanticized, and allow a jihadist to demonstrate that he is not a coward, passive, weak or feminine. The ultimate effort to reject these negative features and "do" masculinity is dying and gaining the status of a martyr, 112 a shahid. Cottee and Hayward argue that rather than emerging from political goals, terrorism can be seen as the result of "existential frustration"
and a desire for excitement, ultimate meaning and glory. 113 Thus, subcultural theory is highly relevant when studying IS and its rhetoric in Dabiq.
An article in honour of the martyr Abu Dujanah al-Khurasani quotes him expressing his love for jihad and the honour of dying in battle.
They used to say, "Some love kills." I do not find that to be true except with the love of jihād, for this love will either kill you with sorrow if you decide to sit and abandon jihād, or it will kill you, making you a martyr fī sabīlillāh if you decide to answer the call. You only have to choose between one of these two deaths.
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IS glorifies violence with the help of religious scripture both to motivate its warriors and to attract new fighters. The slogan "know that Jannah is beneath the shades of swords"
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derives from a central hadith 116 and is common in the magazine.
Dabiq mainly targets men. Other platforms and media channels are used to recruit women. For example, Peresin and Cervone describe a "jihadi girl power subculture" present on social media, 117 but this is absent in Dabiq, which has no pictures depicting women, who are largely discussed rather than addressed. In the quotation below, a warrior is described as leaving behind a pregnant wife to travel and fight for the caliphate.
Abū Qudāmah was a strong young man who left West London, United Kingdom in 2012 with his best friend Abū Mu'āwiyah to answer the call of jihād in Shām. So driven was Abū Qudāmah to fight for the cause of Allah and to seek the greatest of rewards, that he left the UK two months before his baby daughter was born. 118 The portrayal of the masculine warrior is one of a man prioritizing comradeship, war and existential worries over his responsibility to care for his family. The rejection of mainstream values for more subcultural and extreme ones is common in subcultures, but it can also be seen as the ultimate celebration of machismo.
Excitement seeking, stardom and popular culture
The magazine often contains tributes and interviews with jihadists and martyrs who have achieved respect, fame and stardom. Young aspiring jihadists are radicalized not only through a religious or political processes but also by adopting a specific way of talking, walking or dressing themselves through imitation. 119 Sageman argues that imitating terrorists is fashionable and describes how young Muslims see jihad as intriguing and exciting. 120 The socalled "jihadi cool" creates a seductive subculture, attracting young people to participate in global Islamist terrorism because it is considered cool and exciting to be part of a "clandestine undertaking" as a part of a counterculture to Western mainstream society.
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One of these tributes is to Abdelahim Abaaoud, who is interviewed about his jihad in Belgium. As part of a failed terror plot in November 2015, he describes how he was pursued by Western intelligence in an intense and exciting game of "cat and mouse."
After the raid on the safe house, they figured out that I had been with the brothers and that we had been planning operations together. So, they gathered intelligence agents from all over the world -from Europe and America -in order to detain me. 122 In describing his journey back to Syria, he explains how the police failed to apprehend him even when he was stopped by an officer but was not recognized. An image was constructed of an underdog eluding intelligence agents from all over the world and demonstrating skills, intelligence and a cool head. In a subcultural context, this narrative can create recognition and an exciting figure with whom individuals wish to identify themselves. They may not necessarily identify themselves as a "terrorist" but instead embrace a lawless identity by living outside the law-abiding community and rejecting mainstream norms and practices. 123 Flags are a visual tool frequently used to unite people under a common symbol. The soldiers in Dabiq are often posed smiling while holding a black and white IS-flag and weapons that express strength and a potential for violence. A significant gesture frequently made by both children and adults is the lifting of the right hand with a closed fist while the index finger is pointing upward. This is understood as a symbol for the number one and has religious connotations by referring to tawhid (the oneness of God). However, as part of the jihadi subculture, the symbolic meaning can also be considered a gang symbol. 124 Gang members often use gang symbols to express support and community within their respective groups. This sign is easy to imitate and demonstrates support for IS on a transnational level by breaking down language barriers for supporters who do not speak Arabic. 125 The subcultural style visible in the magazine is also promoted through visual and audio-visual entertainment in the form of poems, battle hymns (nasheed) and propaganda videos. They shrewdly combine a reservoir of symbols and clothes while maintaining "the archaic, the religious and the contemporary cool" 126 within the genre of so-called popjihadism. 127 While IS religiously rejects bid'ah (innovation), they still utilize modern tools in the production of propaganda, and Dabiq contains advertisements promoting nasheeds and propaganda videos. The videos are often illustrated with miniature pictures showing one or more clips from the video; the magazine also creates an overview of the "best" videos, promoted them through a top ten list called Selected Ten. These videos have a high production quality and an action-based style and plot, resembling the trailers of films produced in
Hollywood.
The elements of excitement seeking, stardom and popular culture in Dabiq is particularly appealing to young men concerned not only with religion but also the action and fame that are deeply embedded in Western popular culture. Violence as spectacle is an integrated part of attraction, but the fact that it is real also intersects with more marginal
Internet-based phenomena such as the video distribution of violent acts and murders in "snuff films" through gore/shock sites. 128 For insiders, these features are strong indicators of relatively closed subcultures celebrating real-time violence, while for outsiders they mainly create disgust and rejection.
Discussion and conclusion
The radicalization process of an individual does not occur in a vacuum; it is rooted in specific and social environments. 129 Sageman describes this environment as a "loose network of people" who are politically active, inspired by a utopia and reject societal values. 130 This environment can also be considered a myriad of networks that consist of an informal structure of vague, diffuse and porous borders -a social blob. 131 We argue that this type of environment or radicalization can be inspired by a multitude of different -and sometimes conflicting -forms of organization as well as organizational and rhetorical logics. In this paper, we have emphasized the conflict in IS propaganda between social movement framing that attempts to mobilize as many supporters as possible and the more subcultural appeal to marginal groups and a drive toward provocation.
Gerges points out that all jihadist groups sanction spectacular violence to exploit its political and psychological effect. By establishing the caliphate while displaying spectacular violence IS managed to overshadow Al Qaeda. As in many other terrorist groups, the appeal to violence is both a strength and flaw in IS. This can be seen in different terrorist organisations, from Baader-Meinhof Group, Basque Homeland and Liberty, to the Irish Republic Army, and Al Qaeda. 132 Terrorist organizations can attract attention and thus new recruits by the use of violence, but at the same time they risk losing mainstream support. In the case of Al Shabaab, the use of excessive violence was an important reason for why it was rejected in the Somali diaspora. 133 We will still argue that with the graphic details and stylistic staging of violence in Dabiq, IS has taken terrorist organisations symbolic use of violence to a new level. Rumiyah after IS lost Dabiq, and the emphasis on the forthcoming apocalypse was downplayed after the decreasing military successes. Instead, the focus seemed to be on insisting on military success in an attempt to maintain the "rhetoric of change" that was so successful in the beginning. 137 Now, celebrating an utopian past the "narrative of nostalgia" might be exploited as a result of the short-lived success of the caliphate 138 .
Social movement and subcultural perspectives are usually seen as mutually exclusive and often used illustratively by different scholars in radicalization research. They suggest different rhetorical strategies for organizations. For example, this study explains the difficulty in understanding how promoting violence as a spectacle can be effective method of social movement framing when targeting large segments of the population. However, when emphasizing social movement or subcultural frameworks, the question should instead ask why we should assume that IS (or any other organization) is rhetorically coherent. When studying Dabiq, the contrasts between the different forms of propaganda and different articles in the magazine are more striking than any overall similarities. Rhetorical ambiguity can be advantageous because it allows different audiences to become engaged at the same time, but it can also simply reflect different parts, tendencies and languages in an organization. 139 IS is operating in a potent and discordant area, in which a multitude of political subcultures 140 and social movements have emerged, and Dabiq propaganda reflects this.
Previous research on radicalization has emphasized either social movement theory or subcultural theory. We argue that to understand IS and other similar terrorist or extremist organizations, studies should include both perspectives. This can help capture the tension between the different parts of these organisations' propaganda. IS's appeal to a broader audience through raising the concerns of the Muslim majority, fits well with a social movement rationale, and attempts at state-building. IS's promotion and graphic description of excessive violent actions might seem counterintuitive within such a perspective, but it makes sense when seeing how it appeals to a subcultural minority drawn toward otherness and extreme violence. The rhetorical ambiguity was thus a result of attempts at both attracting families to the caliphate and warriors to fight wars. Using violence to create extreme spectacles is a double-edged sword. While it can create media interest and attract excitementseeking young warriors, it impairs the organization both externally and internally and establishes it as a marginal phenomenon.
This study has emphasized the rhetoric in Dabiq, but the tensions between social movement and subcultural dynamics probably cut through many other aspects of the organization as well, including organizational socialization, military strategy and training, recruitment processes and the characteristics of its members. Radicalization and terrorism is a complex phenomenon, 141 and the radicalization processes and recruitment into extreme
Islamist groups consists of multiple and sometimes contradicting dimensions. Future efforts to understand IS and similar organizations must draw on both social movement and subcultural theory in addition to the more traditional religious and political science approaches. A combination of the two could even help illuminate organizational contradictions and rhetorical ambiguities and thus provide a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of terrorism.
